Which Factors Govern the Use of Emergency Response Information Systems? Insights from an Ethnographical Study of a Voluntary Fire Department by Weidinger, Julian et al.
Which Factors Govern the Use of Emergency Response Information Systems? 




Chair of Industrial Information 




Chair of Industrial Information 




Chair of Industrial Information 






To realize the digitalization potential of emergency 
response processes, several information technologies 
have been proposed that shall support firefighters in 
their operations. In the incident command process, 
especially emergency response information systems 
(ERIS) are supposed to raise the situation awareness 
and overall efficacy. Despite their theoretical potential, 
these technologies only slowly disseminate in practice, 
however. While extant acceptance models can basically 
explain firefighters’ intention to use them, the actual 
usage so far remained unexplored. To gain an in-depth 
understanding of the specific domain and its influence 
on the usage of technologies, we ethnographically 
observed a voluntary fire department over several 
years. During its digitalization of command processes, 
we identified operational specialties like flexibility, 
organizational requirements like error culture, and 
social aspects like perceived importance that influence 
the introduction of an ERIS. These factors shall enrich 
existing acceptance models and help to better consider 
the special characteristics of the firefighter domain.  
 
1. Introduction  
Improving the efficacy of emergency responders 
such as firefighters with information technologies is 
receiving increasing attention in academia and practice. 
In recent years, significant efforts have been made to 
digitalize and improve emergency response processes 
[35, 41]. Despite their significant potential, however, 
novel information technologies such as emergency 
response information systems (ERIS), intelligent 
clothing, or digital maps oftentimes disseminate only 
slowly in the firefighter domain [39].  
This observation seems to apply particularly for the 
activity fields of incident commanders (ICs), who 
constantly need to assess the encountered emergency 
situation and make context-dependent decisions to 
coordinate the operation [1]. Information technologies 
reportedly have a significant potential to support the 
command processes, because the situation awareness – 
i.e., the perception of the environmental elements, the 
comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of 
their development – is a critical determinant for the 
quality of such decisions [1, 2, 10]. However, extant 
studies have shown that there exists a significant 
discrepancy between firefighters’ intention to use 
supporting information technologies and the actual 
usage of such technologies in command processes [40]. 
The findings suggest that firefighters are willing to use 
supporting information technologies if they fulfill 
domain-specific requirements. Nevertheless, the actual 
use of such technologies in daily routine remains low.  
Next to the acceptance of information technologies, 
it is hence also necessary to examine their introduction 
and use to fully understand the constraints prevalent in 
the firefighter domain. To help achieving this goal, we 
present the results of a study, in which we observed the 
introduction of an ERIS to support the command 
processes of an exemplary fire department. Thereby, we 
focus on the following research question: “Which 
factors influence the introduction and practical usage of 
information technologies in the firefighter domain?”  
To obtain rich insights into this mostly unexplored 
field of study and be able to comprehend the background 
of our observations, we adopted an ethnographical 
approach. Thereby, one of the authors accompanied the 
introduction of an ERIS at his voluntary fire department, 
which resembles a “typical” organizational unit. While 
the observed fire department is located in Germany, 
there exist comparably organized departments around 
the globe. The obtained results contribute to the body of 
knowledge on the adoption of information technology 
in the emergency response domain. Our findings 
particularly suggest that the introduction and actual use 
of information technology is not only influenced by 
domain-specific user requirements (which determine 
the intention to use such technologies), but also by 





additional team-related and organizational factors, 
which so far have not been considered adequately.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: 
in the next section, we describe the background of our 
study and discuss related work. In section 3, we provide 
details of the ethnographical research methodology. The 
insights gained during our study are discussed in section 
4. Section 5 concludes the paper by highlighting the 
implications and limitations of our study and providing 
an outlook on future research directions. 
2. Background and related work  
To establish a basic understanding of the study’s 
background, we briefly describe the firefighter domain 
and discuss related research.  
2.1. Fire departments and their digitalization 
Around the world, fire departments are assembled 
as specialized emergency response organizations. They 
provide services in non-fault-tolerant, often time-critical 
situations, which largely dictate the characteristics of 
their special domain. With respect to the widely applied 
disaster management cycle [15], fire departments are 
typically concerned with two phases: preparation and 
response. Preparation comprises the provisioning of 
equipment, training the personnel, and defining 
operation procedures. In the response phase, fire 
departments provide help in a variety of emergencies. 
Typical areas of operation are firefighting, technical 
rescue, and hazardous materials operations [1, 6]. Also, 
fire departments play a key role in many scenarios of 
large-scale disasters [15]. Both phases go hand in hand 
since a successful response particularly depends on 
good preparation like the concrete design of local 
processes based on general regulations. Such 
regulations typically provide basic guidelines for the 
most important procedures. One of them is the incident 
command process, since it is crucial for the outcome of 
the whole operation [1, 2]. 
Over the last years, several novel technologies have 
been proposed to digitalize parts of the firefighter work 
and raise the situation awareness of firefighters. Among 
them are unmanned aerial or ground vehicles [18, 19], 
smart protective clothing [4, 30], and many others. A 
technology to specifically support command processes 
can be seen in ERIS. They provide a platform to gather, 
process, and share relevant operational information. As 
shown in Figure 1, they typically comprise an overview 
of responding units, the hierarchical command structure, 
and a situation map of the incident area. From a 
technological point of view, they can be divided in three 
evolutionary stages. Basic ERIS require the manual 
input of data by the user [11, 14]. Advanced systems 
partly automate this data input and capture real-time 
information from different sensors like GPS-positions 
of units or water tank levels [24, 29]. ERIS of the highest 
stage even automate parts of the decision-making by 
calculating recommendations and proposing them to the 
commander [3, 33]. A comprehensive overview of these 
systems can be found in literature [39, 40].  
2.2. Acceptance and use of technologies 
The acceptance and use of novel technologies have 
been extensively researched in the IS literature. The 
most prominent theories aim to explain it based on the 
users’ attitudes and beliefs toward the technology. A 
recent examples of this approach is the Unified Theory 
of Acceptance and Use of Technology [37]. It postulates 
that the users’ Performance Expectancy, Effort 
Expectancy, Social Influence and Facilitating 
Conditions will determine their Behavioral Intention 
and ultimately the Use Behavior. These constructs unify 
findings described in the Innovation Diffusion Theory, 
Technology Acceptance Model, and other established 
theories. Meanwhile, these models have been adapted 
and applied in several business and consumer domains 
[38, 40]. Amongst others, they can explain individual 
and organizational use decisions, utilitarian and hedonic 
scenarios, and mandatory and voluntary use cases. All 
these aspects can be further detailed. For example, 
voluntariness can be divided in several categories [34].  
2.3. Related work  
To identify related work concerning the acceptance 
of information technologies in fire departments, we used 
the results of a broad literature review that we conducted 
for a prior study. It considered EBSCOhost, 
ScienceDirect, SpringerLink, AISeL, ACM DL, and 
IEEE Comp. Soc. DL with search terms like firefighter 
and fire department. For ERIS just like most other 
technologies, we mainly identified studies with a 
technology-centered point of view. Only a few authors 
take the user’s perspective or specifically address their 
acceptance of technologies. Multiple works analyzed Figure 1. Exemplary ERIS "Fireboard" [11] 
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command processes to design suitable interfaces and 
implement them in a system architecture [26, 27]. The 
capabilities of fire departments to adopt information 
technologies has been researched as well [32]. Multiple 
works have identified factors for the acceptance of ERIS 
by firefighters [39]. The integration of these factors into 
an acceptance model, however, illustrated that there 
remain certain blind spots to fully understand under 
which circumstances fire departments use novel 
technologies like ERIS [40]. While the intention to use 
can be reasonably well predicted, the factors governing 
actual usage still can be explained only weakly.  
To examine such unexplored and often social 
phenomena, ethnography has been proven to be a 
suitable method. In the field of sociology, there exist 
several ethnographies examining the specialties of 
emergency responders. Van Maanen, for example, 
exhibits ethnographic research about police officers 
[36]. Regarding firefighters, there has been a special 
focus on wildland firefighting [7, 9] and the role of 
gender [13, 25]. In Information Systems and Computer 
Science research, ethnographic methods have been 
applied to understand firefighter interactions during 
structure fires to derive design implications [8, 20, 28]. 
Other areas of application were the temporal effects of 
information technology in emergency operations [22], 
the interplay between emergency planning and response 
[16], and general interactions of first responders with 
information technology [31]. What comes closest to the 
focus of the work at hand is an ethnographic study about 
introducing digital plans in Swedish fire departments 
[23]. While ethnography therefore seems to be a widely 
applied and established research method in this domain, 
we could not identify studies examining the command 
processes of fire departments. It hence remains unclear 
how emerging technologies such as ERIS can digitally 
support the command processes of firefighters.  
3. Methodology  
To help closing this literature gap, we pursued an 
ethnographical approach that allowed us to gain in-
depth insights into the reality of a fire department and 
the digitalization potentials of its command processes.  
3.1. Research approach 
Following Van Maanen’s seminal guidelines [36], 
our goal was to capture first-hand experiences from the 
firefighter domain. As shown before, such input seems 
necessary to enhance existing acceptance models that 
insufficiently explain firefighters’ use of technologies. 
Participatory observations, as included in ethnographic 
approaches, are especially suited to gain such in-depth 
insights [36]. For several reasons, we decided to observe 
the digitalization of command processes in a voluntary 
fire department. First, despite the publicity of some 
professional departments (like the FDNY), in many 
countries most firefighters are volunteers (e.g., 67% in 
the US, 96% in Germany). Second, one of the authors 
has been a long-year member of a voluntary department, 
thus being able to conduct participatory observations. 
Third, the observed department started a project to 
digitalize its command processes in 2018. Since 
command is vital for the overall success of an operation, 
these processes are of specific interest [1, 2].  
The recommendations of Klein & Myers served as 
another guideline to ensure the rigor of our observation 
and analysis [21]. For contextualization, we described 
the general domain in section 2, details about the case 
are given in the next section. The interaction between 
researcher and subjects was collegial. One of the 
authors is a trained firefighter and has been member of 
the department prior to this study. Therefore, he could 
directly participate in all official and social activities. 
From our point of view, this is the only realistic way to 
obtain in-depth insights and be able to capture multiple 
interpretations from a voluntary fire department. Main 
reasons are that the operations occur extremely 
spontaneously, and most other things happen outside 
normal office hours of a researcher. However, to rule out 
biases (suspicion), the observations were documented in 
a diary and frequently discussed with the non-firefighter 
co-authors. For abstraction and generalization, the 
gathered data was coded, grouped based on common 
themes, and labeled accordingly. The resulting insights 
presented in section 4 were linked to theoretical concept 
wherever possible. Nevertheless, we tried to make our 
observations unprejudiced and linked them to theory 
afterward, to also identify contradictions to or gaps in 
existing theory (dialogical reasoning).  
3.2. The Haßfurt Voluntary Fire Department  
As in many other countries, fire departments are 
organized on the municipal level in Germany. We 
studied the Haßfurt Voluntary Fire Department, a fire 
department that provides emergency services for the 
13,500 inhabitants of Haßfurt. Located in Bavaria, 
Germany, the city is the largest municipality in the rural 
district Haßberge. On an area of 53 km2, it is structured 
into the city center and nine separate city districts.  
Although the pure numbers might seem quite small, 
there are several characteristics that make the city an 
interesting and challenging area from a firefighter’s 
point of view. Haßfurt is linked to all kinds of traffic 
infrastructure. The river Main and its adjacent streams 
flow right through the city. A federal freeway and other 
busy roads cross its boundaries. The city’s regional 
airport processes more than 10,000 annual aircraft 
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movements. Those traffic routes provide the potential of 
ship, car, or aircraft accidents, as well as floods and 
other scenarios. Moreover, the city has several special 
facilities itself. The historic city center comprises many 
culturally significant buildings packed closely together. 
Several schools and retirement homes, as well as the 
hospital have regional catchment areas. There are 
multiple buildings near the high-rise threshold as well 
as industrial plants and warehouses. Large forests and 
agricultural areas complete the highly diverse cityscape. 
All these characteristics combined make Haßfurt a 
rather interesting environment with quite challenging 
conditions in relation to the small size of the city.  
To cope with these challenges, Haßfurt maintains a 
well-equipped and trained voluntary fire department. Its 
main fields of duty are firefighting, technical rescue, and 
hazardous materials operations. The members are 
volunteers, as it is common in Germany. This means that 
training and other predictable activities are done in their 
leisure time, mostly in the evenings. For emergency 
operations, the firefighters get alerted by pagers or 
sirens and head to their station to staff the needed 
vehicles. Over the last years, the department responded 
to an average of 180 annual incidents with a peak at 300. 
The 373 volunteers are supported by two fulltime 
employees in administrative and maintenance issues. 
The department headquarter houses a command center, 
several workshops, and a broad spectrum of specialized 
equipment. Eight smaller fire stations are distributed 
around the city districts. The department operates 22 
vehicles, including engines, ladders, and boats.  
3.3. Digitalization of command processes  
Starting in fall 2018, the fire department has begun 
to continuously improve its incident command (IC) and 
adjacent command support processes. The introduction 
of novel IT solutions has been a key aspect of this still 
ongoing project. Three specific subdomains have been 
iteratively addressed by now (see Table 1). In the first 
iteration, the vehicles were equipped with tablets. On 
these devices, the IC and the squad leaders can access 
relevant information like building plans and operation 
guidelines. Besides that, several apps can be used to 
distribute information amongst the command staff. For 
example, pictures from different angles of the operation 
site, situation maps, and so on can be easily shared.  
In the second iteration, starting in December 2018, 
the command center processes were addressed. The 
command center in the headquarters is staffed in large-
scale disasters like blackouts, thunderstorms, or floods. 
Apart from these special occasions, a regional control 
center alerts departments and coordinates operations. To 
support the commanding of large-scale disasters, the 
command center in Haßfurt was equipped with five PCs 
and the ERIS Fireboard – a basic system with respect to 
the categorization of section 2.1. A command support 
unit (CSU) was formed that is responsible to operate the 
command center. In multiple training sessions, a 
standard staffing of six functions was established: Two 
CSU members answer incoming calls or faxes and 
generate prioritized tasks based on the information. The 
IC and the command assistant allocate the available 
units to these tasks. Finally, two CSU members manage 
and document communications with responding units, 
the regional control center, and other institutions.  
The most impactful iteration started in March 2020 
and concerned the command structures on the site of the 
operations. A new command vehicle was procured and 
configured according to the new, digitalized command 
processes. Amongst others, it contains three computers 
running the ERIS Fireboard and an exterior display for 
situation reports. The vehicle responds to any operation 
of the department. The default staffing was defined with 
Iteration Tablets for command staff Command center Command vehicle 
Focus Single unit + communication Large-scale disasters All mobile operations 












Table 1. Iterations of the observed project 
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three functions: The IC coordinates the operation. The 
command assistant supports the IC in the field. He acts 
as an advisor or gets assigned to command a separate 
sector in larger operations. One CSU member operates 
the vehicle and establishes a command post with it. His 
tasks are to look up relevant information, to maintain 
overviews of responding units and a situation map in the 
ERIS, and to manage and document the communication 
on site, with the control center, and other institutions.  
4. Key observations  
During our study, we gained the following insights 
why and how the observed fire department introduced 
an ERIS and integrated it into its command processes. 
While some results seem to apply to all kinds of fire 
departments, others seem specific for voluntary ones.  
4.1. Emergency management needs flexible 
guidelines instead of rigid processes.  
Amongst firefighters it is widely acknowledged that 
no incident is like the other and unexpected events can 
occur in virtually any situation. Over the last years, we 
observed countless examples for this in Haßfurt: a car 
standing vertically on its front after an accident, multiple 
gas containers in what appeared to be a normal vehicle 
fire, exotic scorpions in a burning apartment, etc. The 
same applies to the command of an operation. It is 
hardly possible to estimate the needed means and 
processes of command at the beginning of an operation. 
Imagining a BPMN of emergency command processes, 
there would be endless branching gateways and ad-hoc 
structures needed to come near a realistic illustration.  
Due to this level of uncertainty, fire departments 
need flexibility in their work. As Denef et al. [8] framed 
it: the structures of firefighter operations are rigid, but 
the units acting within these structures are largely 
independent. This also is the case in Haßfurt, where 
firefighters organize in teams, squads, and platoons. For 
some operation types, these units’ initial measures are 
given in standard operating procedures. All measures 
beyond the initial phase, however, are dependent of the 
specific situation. Instead of fixed processes, firefighters 
rely on guidelines like mnemonics, checklists, and 
regulations. The regulation for command, for example, 
structures an emergency command process into a circle 
with three phases: reconnaissance, planning, and issuing 
of orders [1]. The command staff iterates through this 
circle multiple times during an operation. Each officer 
applies it for his/her current situation, the unit(s) under 
command, and the orders from higher command levels.  
This quite basic circle has also proofed to be a solid 
base to deduce functions and tasks in the digitalized 
command processes of the observed department. The 
tablets help squad leaders in their reconnaissance. In the 
command center, capturing information from telephone 
and fax supports reconnaissance, the allocation of units 
is a planning task, and communication supports the 
issuing of orders. In the command vehicle, all three 
phases are supported by a single operator. Precise 
processes are defined in neither of the three areas. Only 
checklists are provided for certain tasks like launch of 
the respective devices, available systems including their 
features, etc. Priority lists define specific tasks that must 
be executed in any case, for example ensuring 
communication with the control center. Other tasks are 
defined as optional and are executed ad-hoc in idle times 
or on request. Posters provide overviews of the most 
important tasks that can be requested from the CSU.  
The described degree of flexibility in the process 
must consequently be representable in the used systems, 
as well. This assessment also corresponds with other 
studies, in which flexibility has been shown as a major 
factor for the intention to use an ERIS [40]. We could 
observe such flexibility in many regards in the ERIS 
used in Haßfurt. The main functionalities are grouped in 
freely accessible modules like resources to organize 
units and operation logs to protocol important events. 
There is no defined order in which the modules must be 
used. While often-used data like properties of local units 
can be pre-defined, the user can always add new 
elements at runtime. In the multi-user mode, the tasks 
can be freely distributed among the users. What requires 
flexibility of the user, however, is that the system can 
crash, which we observed a couple of times. In that case, 
the user will switch to pen and paper as a backup and – 
if there is time – they will try to solve the problem.  
4.2. Command structures must be able to grow 
and adapt with the operation structures.  
From a firefighter perspective, a burning fire has 
many factors in common with a living creature. It needs 
air to breath, it consumes flammable materials as food, 
and it grows. Generally, diffusion or spread is seen as 
one of the major dangers in any type of emergency 
operation. Diffusion needs to be prevented or, if it is 
inevitable, the responding units need to adjust their 
response according to it. For this reason, emergency 
operations grow like fires do. Growing operations imply 
increasing numbers of units. For these additional units, 
the command structures must be able to grow in an 
equivalent way. Therefore, German fire departments 
think in four levels of command. They range from level 
A, where the squad leader of a single unit commands 
without support, to level D, where an executive staff acts 
with numerous support personnel and consultants. 
Within these levels, the operation can be divided in areal 
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or thematical sectors and sub-sectors. As a rule of 
thumb, each officer shall have at least two and at most 
five units or sectors under their command.  
The focus on command levels was evident in the 
observed case, as well. The tablets for the squad leaders 
support level A, the command vehicle the levels B-C, 
and the command center the levels C-D. While the 
levels as such seemed quite clear from the beginning, it 
was the transition from one level to another that caused 
problems. In the command center, a Thunderstorm in 
2019 showed that the standard staffing of six functions 
cannot be realized right from the beginning. The 
voluntary members of the CSU arrive at the station one 
by one, while the telephones start ringing in the first 
minute. As a reaction, a preliminary stage was defined, 
in which the most important tasks are divided among 
only three functions. In the command vehicle, the 
suspected emission of explosive gases in an industrial 
plant in September 2020 demonstrated how fast the 
standard staffing of three functions can be overwhelmed 
with a growing operation. At that time, there was no real 
concept on how to grow. Especially the operator of the 
vehicle was unable to fulfill all the given tasks 
(communicate with IC and control center, research the 
dangers from the emitted gas, define staging areas for 
approaching units, etc.). Meanwhile, the vehicle gets 
staffed with four functions for certain types of 
emergencies. If further growing is needed, additional 
CSU members from other units get assigned to man 
functions 5 and 6. Responses to fires in a hospital (2020) 
and a dormitory (2021) showed a clear improvement.  
This ability to grow, which might be referred to as 
scalability, could in parts be observed in the used ERIS, 
as well. In the system, the operation can be easily 
divided into sectors and units can be assigned to them. 
The numbers of personnel are automatically summed up 
for the whole operation. Most importantly, there is a 
multi-user functionality that, however, only works for 
local networks by default. Looking at the literature, the 
growing of operations and scalability of used systems 
has not been of great interest, so far. Most authors do 
concentrate on specific levels of command, i.e. single 
units [8], normal-size operations [41], or large-scale 
disasters [35]. However, the transition from one level to 
the other is hardly discussed in the literature. Also in 
practitioner outlets, most of the work seems to be only 
concerned with the separate levels [1, 2]. The same 
applies for the acceptance of ERIS, for which scalability 
has by now not been examined as a relevant factor.  
4.3. Lack of error culture is one possible root 
for a perceived resistance to change.  
In operations, trainings, and interactions with other 
departments, we observed a significant resistance to 
change among firefighters. While this finding is in line 
with other studies and practitioner outlets [12, 39], we 
could also observe some possible roots for this 
phenomenon. Generally, there seems to be an attitude to 
never change a running system. Changes might risk the 
reliability of usual habits and making them right is a 
time-consuming task. More specific for fire departments 
is that they feel a strong pressure to appear as competent 
and infallible in the eyes of the public. It is essential that, 
in an emergency with lives at stake, people blindly trust 
their fire department. Therefore, it is quite common 
among fire departments that mistakes are not discussed 
in public or in front of outsiders. While this may still 
appear plausible and reasonable, many departments 
overdo it. They often do not even internally talk about 
errors and possible consequences. It appears to us that 
they confuse the outwardly presented infallibility with 
an actual one – which can, realistically, not be reached.  
This situation can be described as a lack of error 
culture that is, of course, not a black or white situation. 
Many departments try to introduce a more open 
handling of errors. In this regard, the observed case is a 
pleasant example. The adaption of command processes 
in Haßfurt was informed by identified and analyzed 
errors. During the iterative process of improvement, 
feedback was frequently gathered and openly discussed. 
Of course, there remained skeptics in the department 
and even within the CSU that considered the project to 
be exaggerated for the size of the department or a waste 
of time. However, with each training or operation, in 
which improvements over the former status quo got 
visible, these voices fell silent. Meanwhile, the new 
processes have become firmly established within the 
department. The major drawback remains that they are 
still quite unique in the surrounding area. Most of the 
neighboring departments observed this “revolution” 
rather suspiciously than openly interested.  
Summing up, the widespread lack of error culture 
amongst fire departments seems to decline only slowly. 
The small steps toward a more open attitude seem to be 
depending on the will and perseverance of individuals. 
To better understand the interrelationships between 
error culture and resistance to change as well as their 
impact on the acceptance and use of technologies, 
further research is necessary.  
4.4. Unveiling experiences or due investments 
trigger major progress.  
Apart from the general existence of an error culture, 
we could observe two triggers that seem to be needed 
for substantial progress in a fire department. First and 
foremost, a firefighter relies on his own experiences. Be 
it at fighting fires or using hydraulic rescue tools – 
firefighters seem to learn things best by doing them. 
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This focus on personal experiences often transfers to 
decision making. Progress like fundamental process 
adaptions is often triggered by events that illustrate need 
for action. Another, more external trigger can be due 
investments. Typically, publicly funded equipment of a 
fire department gets replaced on a regular basis. In a 
voluntary department the replacement cycle of a vehicle 
can be more than 25 years. On the one hand, whenever 
the replacement of a vehicle is pending, it triggers the 
department to get informed about the current state of the 
art. On the other hand, internally desired progress must 
often wait for such a due investment, because old 
equipment cannot be adjusted for the new requirements 
or there is simply no financial support.  
For the command center in Haßfurt, the triggering 
event was a thunderstorm in 2015, which confronted the 
department with more than 100 incidents in less than an 
hour. Until then the command center coordinated large 
operations for many years, most prominently floods of 
the river Main. There has always been a long lead time 
and the situation changed only sporadically. In the 2015 
thunderstorm, however, the untrained personnel with 
their usual paper forms and Excel sheets were totally 
overwhelmed. Based on this event, the CSU was 
established, and the command center got its digital 
upgrade. For the command vehicle, there was an 
unveiling event, as well. At a structure fire in 2017 with 
two fatalities the IC could not contact the control center 
with his handheld radio. For the stronger vehicle radio, 
he had to run a hundred meters away from the incident 
area several times. At that time, command support was 
completely missing in mobile operations. However, in 
this case the desired technologies could not be 
integrated into the existing equipment. The command 
vehicle at that time was an SUV without sufficient space 
for any computer workstations. Consequently, it needed 
the procurement of a new command vehicle, that was 
planned for some years later, as an additional trigger.  
Summing up, we observed two triggers to introduce 
novel technologies in a fire department. First, users must 
be convinced by own experiences. It seems reasonable 
to intentionally evoke such experiences in trainings 
instead of real operations to avoid dangers and not 
depend on chance. This way, technologies and processes 
can also be better standardized across the departments. 
While we observed such approaches in practitioner 
seminars, technology acceptance literature has not taken 
this topic into focus. Neither has the second trigger of 
due investments been researched.  
4.5. Personnel is biggest strength and biggest 
weakness of a voluntary fire department.  
On first sight, it appears clear that qualified 
personnel is scarce in fire departments – just like in most 
other professions. In voluntary fire departments, 
however, personnel matters are of a quite unique, two-
fold nature. On the one hand, voluntary firefighters do 
their service as a (very special) hobby besides their 
actual job. Due to this fact, the members can come from 
all social groups. They may comprise highly educated 
and specialized experts of virtually any profession. In 
that regard, they may even have higher educated 
personnel than professional departments in certain 
areas. The experts can be used to address highly 
complex topics and problems. On the other hand, 
especially these higher qualified members tend to 
commute to other cities or are engaged in their actual 
job during office hours. They are hence less available 
for emergency operations in these times. Consequently, 
especially the most important tasks in the initial phase 
of an emergency response must be comprehensible for 
any ordinary firefighter and not only a few experts.  
The fact that the adaption of command processes in 
Haßfurt went hand in hand with the introduction of 
novel information technologies was only possible 
because the department had multiple IT experts. They 
implemented specific solutions in the command center 
and vehicle and the used systems. One example is the 
administration of continuous VPN connections between 
the ERIS workstations for remote multi-user access. In 
Operations, all CSU members take turns on the vehicle. 
For the less experienced users, there are checklists 
provided for the most common tasks as well as the 
handling of the most frequent errors. Besides that, 
certain routine activities like the transfer of unit status 
and alarm data from the control center into the ERIS 
were automated. These are just some of the measures 
taken to facilitate the work in the command vehicle and 
in similar form in the command center.  
Regarding the used ERIS, most users acknowledge 
that it is quite intuitive to use but still requires some 
routine. Especially for the firefighters that do not 
regularly work with computers in their job, we could 
observe a noticeable insecurity. However, only by 
including this group, the staffing of command vehicle 
and center in Haßfurt can be ensured throughout the day. 
This demonstrates why processes and technologies in 
emergency management must be generally designed for 
the easiest possible handling in operations. This is in 
line with existing literature, in which ease of use is seen 
as a major acceptance factor for ERIS and other systems 
[40]. The question of personnel availability, however, is 
rarely raised in the literature. One reason might be that 
voluntary departments are much more affected by this 
problem than the more often studied professional ones. 
Nevertheless, voluntary departments are the vast 
majority in many countries and not all professional 
departments do have IT experts. Hence, future research 
must consider the availability of qualified personnel as 
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a non-trivial requirement for digitalization, especially in 
fire departments.  
4.6. Command work must be perceived as 
important and can be perceived as fun.  
As we observed, the common firefighter seems to 
be a craftsman. He/She likes manual work and to see the 
results of the actions right away: splash water and the 
fire goes out, kick in the door and the way is free. In 
contrast to manual actions, command work is of a more 
theoretical nature and its results are less visible. The 
command staff itself may have the power of decision-
making as a kind of compensation. The command 
support staff, however, has theoretical work to do 
without any apparent benefit. While this applies for all 
kinds of fire departments, the problem is further 
increased for the voluntary ones. First, there are very 
limited options for disciplinary consequences since a 
volunteer is much less dependent than an employee. 
Second, the members do the service as a hobby and 
typically seek a change from their everyday work 
routine. Especially the ones working with computers all 
day do not necessarily want to continue this activity in 
their hobby, while the others do “the real work”. It is 
these people, however, who are best suited for the 
command support. All in all, motivating firefighters for 
this kind of work appears to be a difficult task.  
One key factor of success in the observed case was 
to establish an overall understanding of the importance 
of command and especially command support. The 
commanders tried to keep the events triggering the 
process adaption and the expected improvements in the 
minds of their firefighters. They did so with personal 
conversation, by mentioning them in meetings and press 
releases. The establishing of the CSU as a special task 
force illustrated the topic’s significance as well. CSU 
members obtain incentives like specialized trainings or 
seminars and the option to “reserve” the command 
vehicle in an online calendar. In that time, they can 
assume the operator position despite the common first-
come-first-served staffing principle. What might seem 
like negligible trifles does work much better than 
monetary incentives in this special domain, since the 
firefighters work out of conviction. Another motivator 
we could observe was fun. Especially for younger 
members, the use of an ERIS can be framed as playing 
a video game. Amongst some of this group the term of 
“playing Fireboard” has meanwhile become established.  
Be it perceived importance or just fun – especially 
for voluntary fire departments it is important that the 
members are motivated and show the desired behavior 
as result of their own will. While we know of several 
practitioner publications about motivating firefighters, 
research has so far largely omitted the topic. In most 
cases, firefighter information technologies are examined 
from a technological point of view and human factors 
are left out. In the literature of technology acceptance in 
general, however, there are several constructs that might 
help to map the observed phenomenon. Job relevance 
[5] and Perceived enjoyment [17] might be suitable 
concepts for what we called perceived importance and 
fun. Hedonic motivation [38], Intrinsic motivation [37] 
or various aspects of Voluntariness [34] might capture 
the overall topic. Such human or social factors should 
receive more attention in future research of firefighters’ 
use of technologies. Our observation indicates that they 
are essential for the success of such projects.  
5. Concluding Remarks 
During our ethnography, we could gain in-depth 
insights into factors influencing the digitalization of 
command processes in a voluntary fire department. The 
study has implications for academia and practice alike.  
5.1. Implications  
From the academic point of view, we elaborated on 
many specific aspects that characterize the firefighter 
domain. This complements existing literature that does 
acknowledge the domain’s high specialty but 
insufficiently explains exactly why it is so special. Our 
study constitutes a detailed domain characterization 
with specific focus on the highly important command 
process. At the same time, we answered our initial 
research question and identified several factors that 
influence the introduction and practical usage of new 
information technologies in the firefighter domain. 
These add several new perspectives, which enrich extant 
models explaining the acceptance of / intention to use 
technologies like ERIS [40]. The first perspective 
concerns specificities of the command process itself 
with a high degree of flexibility and scalability in 
processes, personnel, and systems as important factors. 
As a second perspective, we found organizational 
requirements for progress like the introduction of novel 
technologies, namely an existing error culture, the 
presence of a triggering event, and due investments. 
Finally, we identified human or motivational aspects 
such as personnel availability, perceived importance, 
and fun. Exactly these soft factors might resemble some 
of the blind spots of extant acceptance models. 
Including them may lead to a more holistic 
understanding of the topic. Next to the firefighter 
domain, our insights are transferable to other emergency 
management domains, especially those with comparable 
volunteer structures. Some findings like the unexpected 
importance of soft factors for the use of technologies are 
also relevant for business or private contexts. The 
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gained insights did, however, not only deliver answers 
but created just as many open questions that may serve 
as starting points for future research. Some of our own 
plans will be described in section 5.3.  
For practice, we shed light on the phenomena and 
mechanisms in voluntary fire departments that so far 
might even have remained hidden for those involved. 
On the one hand, this concerns the firefighters 
themselves. The awareness for their own needs and 
ability to articulate them may be strengthened by our 
insights. Furthermore, uncovered aspects like the lack of 
error culture may initiate a rethinking in departments. 
On the other hand, the vendors of technologies can use 
our findings to better match their products to the users’ 
needs. Products that better support firefighters during 
their operations will ultimately raise their efficacy and 
may save lives in the long run.  
5.2. Limitations  
When interpreting our results, several limitations 
should be considered. First of all, we observed a single 
case (i.e., one fire department). Although our contacts to 
other departments confirmed most of our assessments, 
there might still be undiscovered differences. Moreover, 
our research object was a voluntary department in 
Germany. While our insights into operational processes 
will be transferable to professional departments as well, 
other findings are rather specific for voluntary ones. 
Also, the insights may only be transferable to countries 
like the US, where comparable volunteer structures 
exist. The specific focus on command processes only 
partly allows for statements about other processes in a 
department, as well. Also, our approach to provide a 
broad overview of several aspects prevented a deeper 
discussion of each aspect on its own.  
General limitations associated with the method of 
ethnography are the lack of quantifiability and the 
challenge of objectivity. In particular, the researcher 
was deeply involved as a long-year firefighter. This 
appeared to be the only realistic way for ethnographic 
work in a voluntary fire department with spontaneous 
operations and most other activities in the leisure time. 
However, to control the rigor of our study, we followed 
established rules [21]. Frequent discussions with the less 
involved co-authors were moreover conducted to 
prevent biased interpretations. The pandemic situation 
leads to an additional limitation, since there were 
restricted training conditions and lower incident 
numbers at times during our study.  
5.3. Future Research  
As mentioned before, the project of digitalizing the 
command processes in the Haßfurt Fire Department is 
still ongoing. We want to continue our observation and 
try to gather additional insights. With the end of the 
Corona pandemic, more trainings and an increasing 
number of incidents can be expected. We also plan to 
conduct semi-structured interviews with the involved 
actors. This way, our observations can be complemented 
with firefighters’ subjective perceptions. Another plan 
is to interview experts from other departments. Our 
experience makes us assume that the identified insights 
will largely apply to most fire departments, at least in 
Germany. Nevertheless, there might be additional 
factors or alternative interpretations that should be 
considered. The ethnographical insights may be used to 
enhance existing models to describe the acceptance and 
use of information technologies by firefighters. Finally, 
the long-term appropriation of ERIS after the initial 
acceptance is of interest. For these endeavors, we hope 
to provide a suitable starting point with the results of our 
study.  
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